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TRANSITORY CHATTELS AND
STATIONARY LAW: A PROPOSAL TO
FACILITATE SECURED FINANCING OF
AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED IN
INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT
By

CHARLES SAMUEL DOSKOW

A.B., University of Wisconsin
LL.B., Harvard

I.

T

HIS article is concerned with questions of finance, property rights
and their transfer, and private international law. The subject of
the paper may be summed up by this question: What can be done to
create a climate in which institutions in the United States will be able
to finance the purchase of aircraft to be used in international flight
by reserving to themselves chattel security in the craft which will be
upheld in the courts of the foreign nations into which the aircraft
travels?
In connection with this question it will be necessary to look to
what little current law there is in the field of private international law
that bears upon the problem. It will also be profitable to look to the
small amount of current American international maritime practice
which adds something to the discussion.
In part this paper is the result of a search for cases which failed to
turn up controlling authority. Although many aircraft fly international
routes, and the airlines that fly them depend on financing institutions
to get the planes into the air, no case which deals even remotely with
the specific question was found. Although there is an international
convention on the subject, no cases have been found which have been
decided under it. Therefore, most of the authority which has been
investigated is at best applicable by analogy; and it is one of my contentions that even as analogy it ought not control the field.
American airlines are now in the process of a fundamental change
in the nature of their chief asset.' This has involved and will continue
in years to come to involve the commitment of an unusually large portion of their current income to capital expenditures. 2 The present
method of financing does not involve chattel security,3 for reasons
1 Donahue & Perry, Airline Financing and Operational Problems, 23
OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE 151 (1956).

2 Ibid. The authors bring to light this interesting
revenues for all U.S. airlines total $1,600,000,000,
$2,000,000,000 in commitments for future purchases
3 Adkins & Billyou, A Proposed New Form of
of Our Airlines and Railroads, 12 Business Lawyer
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figure: at a time when annual
the airlines had outstanding
of equipment.
Security for the Senior Debt
378, 390; 24 JOURNAL OF Am

LAW AND COMMERCE 465, 475 (1957). The statement in the text is with reference

only to aircraft used in international flights.
36
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which are only partly discussed in this paper. It may be that the lack
of a ready market for a repossessed airplane makes the entire process of
chattel security finance less advantageous than in other areas. But there
are in fact many airlines in the world today, and most of them are
involved in the changeover to jet aircraft. Thus a worldwide market
of some sort should be available during at least the first few years of
the changeover, which are the years in which difficulties are most likely
to arise.
It is herein proposed that a single clear-cut rule be established
which will control all dealings with a single aircraft or a fleet. This
would carry over into international air law a principle of admiralty
under which, for certain purposes, the law of the flag of the craft controls all questions of law arising concerning the craft.4 There is already
a statute and a recording system in this country capable of being made
the hub of such an international system. Such a rule can do no more
than act as a binding rule of law on foreign courts. But, as will be
discussed,5 there are other forces than those of justice which can be
brought to bear to assure that justice is done. We must of course rest
on the courts of any country where a chattel is even temporarily located
to protect the interest of the rightful owners; neither this proposal nor
any other can do away with such dependence. What it attempts to
accomplish is a removal of the uncertainty inherent in a worldwide
conglomerate of systems of private international law.
II.
The Restatement of Conflict of Laws adopts the rule that questions
concerning the creation of security interests and reservations of
title in chattels are to be decided by the law of the situs of the chattel
at the time of the creation of the interest.6 The leading case illustrating
this rule is YoussoupofJ v. Widener.7 In this case the plaintiff and
defendant first negotiated in England for the purchase by defendant
of certain paintings then in England, but the contract was finally
entered into when the parties were in Pennsylvania. The agreement
provided that the seller could, within a certain specified time, regain
the paintings by repayment of the purchase price, and this suit was
brought to enforce that option. The plaintiff urged that Pennsylvania
law, which would have upheld the provision, controlled, but the court
held that English law, which did not give it effect, was the lex situs of
the chattels at the time of the agreement, and therefore controlled. 8
4 Gilmore & Black, The Law of Admiralty 574-79 (1957) ; 3 Rabel, The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study 72. (1952)
5 1nfra, 19-20.
6 Restatement, Conflict of Laws, secs. 265, 272.
7246 N.Y. 175, 158 N.E. 64 (1927).
8 Another case involving two nations is New York Trust Co. v. Island Oil &
Transportation Co., 33 F. 2d 104 (2nd Cir. 1929). There a pledge of stock made
in New York was held not to apply to stock which was located in Mexico at the
time of the transaction. The court said that Mexican law would apply to the creation of any security interest in the stock. These two cases appear to contradict the
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When the chattel is removed into another jurisdiction, the conflict
questions become more complex. The Restatement requires that interests created in the first state be recognized in the second 9 and this is
done even in situations where it is not given effect in the second state. 0
Sections 269 and 277 state the rules that make security difficult, particularly where the chattel is by its nature a migratory one. Those sections
say that dealings with the chattel in the second jurisdiction may create
new interests in the chattel, if the law of the second state so provides.1
Absent constitutional requirements, 12 such a rule is less a choice of
law than a recognition of judicial power over a chattel within the
jurisdiction of the court. The choice occurs when the court of the
second jurisdiction either does or does not give the reservation effect
to defeat the local interests created. But it should be remembered
throughout this discussion that the cases on this question have only
limited applicability insofar as American or English courts sit in the
general rule deduced in Stumberg, Chattel Security Transactions and the Conflict
of Laws, 27 Iowa L. Rev. 528 (1942) that the law of the place in which the chattel
is intended to be used by the party having possession of it controls, between the
parties. In both of these cases the chattel was removed into the jurisdiction in
which the parties were said to have contracted before the suit was brought, yet
situs law was held to control. See also Steckel v. Swift, 56 S.W. 2d 806 (Mo. App.
1933); Mackey v. Pettyjohn, 6 Kan. App. 57, 49 Pac. 636 (1897), 57 A.L.R. 708
(1928). It should be noted that the cases cited by Stumberg which support his
proposition that the law of the place where the chattel is intended to be used is to
be applied (e.g. Beggs & Co. v. Bartels 73 Conn. 132, 46 Atl. 874 (1900)) would
be impossible to apply in the case of a peripatetic chattel. Jewett v. Keystone
Driller Co. 282 Mass. 469, 185 N.E. 369, 87 A.L.R. 298 (1933) is a holding that
the law of the place of contracting controls. The case involved the question of the
right of the mortgagor to redeem; Restatement sec. 281 specifically provides that
the law of the situs at the time of the mortgage, lien, or pledge, controls the right
to redeem.
9 Sec. 260.
10 The question of recognition of the interest created is a distinct one from

that of giving it effect to defeat a local transaction. See, e.g. Universal Credit Co.
v. Marks, 164 Md. 130, 163 A. 810 (1932); Consolidated Garage Co. v. Chambers,
111 Texas 293, 231 S.W. 1074 (1921).
11 Sections 270, 271, 277, 278. The Restatement draws a distinction between the
cases in which the chattel is levied upon in the second state by creditors of the
mortgagor, and cases where the chattel is sold to a bona fide purchaser there. In
the latter case 271 requires that a statute of the second state provide that the bona
fide purchaser prevail (if the instrument was properly recorded in the first state)
while it is sufficient in the case of an attaching creditor that the "law" of the
second state so provides. Most American jurisdictions have reached the result of
271 by judicial construction without the aid of statute. Metro-Plan,Inc. v. KotcherTurner, Inc., 296 Mich. 400, 296 N.W. 304 (1941); Bank of Atlanta v. Fretz, 148
Texas 551, 226 S.W. 2d 843 (1950). The Restatement also continues the old distinction between removal with the consent of the holder of the security interest
and removal without such consent. Thus, while sections 270 and 271 permit the
mortgagee to be defeated if the removal was with his consent, section 268 will only
allow a new lien priority and will not allow the defeat of the prior interest where
the consent to the removal was not present. See also 277, 278 compared with 275.
This distinction is of no importance where it is contemplated that the mortgagee
or conditional vendor will permit taking the chattel into other jurisdictions as it
must in the case of aircraft.
12 The Supreme Court has never passed on the constitutionality of holdings
in which the valid security interest created in the first state was defeated by dealings in the second state where removal was without the consent of the holder of
the security interest. Stumberg, supra, note 8, at 548, but Stumberg states, and
I agree, that there can be little question of the legislative jurisdiction or power of
a court to deal with chattels within its borders, no matter how they got there.
Stumberg, supra at 542.
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second jurisdiction. The situation contemplated in this paper is one
in which the second jurisdiction may turn out to be any country in
the world.
But even apart from considerations of judicial power, such a rule
appears necessary and proper. A reservation good in one jurisdiction,
where notice is most likely to be available to those who might have
need of it, cannot validly be carried over to affect the rights of those
who may very well be totally ignorant of the fact that the chattel has
ever been in any other place, unless the law under which they are
acting so provides. Particularly where the second state is the forum
will we expect a holding that will protect local bona fide purchasers
and creditors. The single fact that the law does not look with favor
upon enforcement of foreign chattel mortgages and other title reservations against persons who have dealt with the chattel in jurisdictions
other than the one in which the interest has been created without the
law of the second jurisdiction so providing is the problem which must
be overcome to make security effective in this area.
The largest body of reported cases in this area deal with chattels
upon which security interests have been reserved which the law of the
place of the creation of the interest requires to be recorded there. Most
courts, while recognizing the principle enunciated in United States
Fidelity & GuaranteeCo. v. Northwest Engineering Co."s that recording
laws have no extraterritorial effect, but affect rights only within the
jurisdiction which enacted them, have gone very far to protect the
conditional vendor of automobiles wrongfully removed from the original jurisdiction and taken to a second state and sold to bona fide
purchasers there. 14 But again a word of caution is in order that these
are American courts dealing with other American created interests. 15
A series of English cases with international facts 6 have dealt with
13146 Miss. 476, 112 So. 580 (1927). In this case property was sold in Wisconsin for immediate shipment to Mississippi, under a conditional sales contract
which was not recorded in Wisconsin. The reservation of title was invalid in Wisconsin unless recorded there, but Mississippi, where the chattel was at the time of
the suit, did not require recording. The conditional vendor sought to recover the
machines from levying creditors of the vendee who had no notice of the reservation.
The court resolved the conflict by holding that the Wisconsin law only required
recording to make the reservation good against Wisconsin creditors and purchasers,
and the statute made no such requirement of recording that his failure to record
would defeat the vendor in this situation.
14 Metro-Plan,Inc. v. Kotcher-Turner,Inc., 296 Mich. 400, 296 N.W. 304 (1941).
15 It should be noted at this point that the fears expressed herein concerning
the conflict rules of foreign courts do not apply in reverse. The American courts
make no distinction between sister states of the Union and foreign nations. Dubois,
The Significance in Conflict of Laws of the Distinction Between Interstate and
InternationalTransactions,17 Minn. L. Rev. 361 (1932). The author of the article,
who went behind the language of the courts and looked at the facts of many of the
American cases which have international facts, concluded that he found not even
evidence of subconscious prejudice resulting in a tendency to choose American law,
where a choice existed. He further points out that at least one American state,
although under no constitutional obligation to do so, has treated foreign judgments
as judgments from other American states, and has thus far refused to look behind
them.6
1 Liverpool Marine Credit Co. v. Hunter, 1868 L. R. 3 Ch. 479; Hooper v.
Gumm, 1867 L. R. 2 Ch. App. 282; Castrique v. Imrie, 1870 L. R. 4 H. L. 414;
Simpson v. Fogo, 1863 1 H. & M. 195, 71 E. R. 85.
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the problem of a mortgaged ship in a foreign jurisdiction. With one
exception 17 (and that on a singular set of facts which could no longer
occur 8 ) they support the view that the second situs can deal with
foreign-created interests so as to destroy them in a valid proceeding by
local creditors. 19 Thus, even in cases where the forum is the situs of
the original interest, there is no guarantee that that interest will be
protected. These cases involve ships, transient chattels like aircraft.
To them we might well apply the considerations here proposed to be
applied to aircraft: that sails are notice of foreign travels, and a foreign
flag notice of a foreign registration. In the nineteenth century it would
have been unreasonable to require a London title search of a New
Orleans creditor. Today it would not be. It can be argued that the
nineteenth century cases would not stand up as good law today, even
absent the English statute on ship mortgages.
III.
The United States in 1938 adopted a recording system for aircraft.20
The American law of the transfer of aircraft has grown up under this
statute, and it is this body of law which would be applied by an American or foreign court which had elected or been required to follow
American law in a case involving a security interest in an American
"flag" plane.
The Civil Aeronautics Act requires all aircraft eligible for recordation to be recorded in Washington with the CAB .21 This includes all
craft owned by a citizen of the United States not registered in a foreign
state, and all craft owned by any governmental agency.2 2 Further, all
interests held by any party other than the owner are required to be
recorded.28 It was held in an early case that these provisions did not
apply to craft which were not flown or intended to be flown in inter17 Simpson v. Fogo.
18 Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Victor Motor Co., 33 So. 2d 703 (La. App.

1948), which held that although conditional sales are invalid when contracted in
Louisiana, the courts of Louisiana will recognize them under rules of comity, and
give effect to them to defeat local bona fide purchasers. In Simpson v. Fogo, 1863
1 H. & M. 195, 71 E. R. 85, the Vice-Chandellor refused to give effect to a Louisiana
decree defeating the security interest because such a reservation could not be made
under Louisiana law and would not be recognized there. The court said, "A title
perfect by the lex loci contractus was rejected simply because the transfer was one
which could not have taken place under the laws of Louisiana." 1 J. & H. at 30,
70 E. R. at 649.
19 Zaphiriou, The Transfer of Chattels in Private International Law, 174
(London,1956).
20 52 Stat. 1005 (1938) ; 49 U.S.C. 521-23 (1951).
2152 Stat. 1005 (1938); 49 U.S.C. 521(a). 521(b) defines aircraft eligible for
recordation as follows:
(1) [aircraft] owned by a citizen of the United States and not registered
under the laws of any foreign state; or
(2) ... aircraft of the federal government, or of a state, territory, or possession of the United States, or the District of Columbia, or of a political
subdivision thereof.
22 Ibid.
2352 Stat. 1006 (1938),

as amended, 54 Stat. 1235 (1940), as amended, 62
Stat. 494 (1948), 49 U.S.C. 523. See 14 C.F.R. 501-505. 49 U.S.C. 523(a) provides:
The Administrator shall establish and maintain a system for the recording of
each and all of the following:
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state commerce, 24 but later cases have thoroughly discredited this
25
holding.
The Act further requires that the interests of all holders of security
interests be recorded to be valid against persons without notice. 26 In
most respects section 523 has been interpreted as any similar statute
which determines, the rights of parties to an agreement which is required to be recorded under state law. Thus it has been held that the
contract, although unrecorded, is good as between the parties. 27 The
(1)

Any conveyance which effects the title to, or any interest in, any civil
aircraft of the U.S.
(2) Any lease, and any mortgage, equipment trust, contract of conditional
sale, or other instrument executed for security purposes, which lease or
other instrument affects the title to, or any interest in, any specifically
identified aircraft engine or engines of 750 or more rated take-off horsepower for each such engine or the equivalent of such horsepower, and also
any assignment or amendment thereof or supplement thereto;
(3) Any lease, and any mortgage, equipment trust, etc. of conditional sale,
or other instrument executed for security purposes, which lease or other
instrument affects the title to, or any interest in, any aircraft engines,
propellers, or appliances maintained by or on behalf of an air carrier
certificated under 554(b) of this title for installation or use in aircraft,
aircraft engines, or propellers, or any spare parts maintained by or on
behalf of such an air carrier, which instrument need only describe generally by types the engines, propellers, appliances, and spare parts covered
thereby and designate the location or locations thereof; and also any
assignment or amendment thereof or supplement thereto.
(b) The Administrator shall also record under the system provided for in subsection (a) of this section any release, cancellation, discharge, or satisfaction relating to any conveyance or other instrument recorded under said system.
24 Aviation Credit Co. v. Gardner, 174 Misc. 798, 22 N.Y.S. 2d 37 (Sup. Ct.
1940).
25 In re Veterans' Air Express, 76 F. Supp. 684 (D.N.J. 1948); Blalock v.
Brown, 78 Ga. App. 537, 51 S.E. 2d 610, 9 A.L.R. 2d 476 (1949). In the latter case
there was a failure to record by the first purchaser, and then a sale by the seller
to an innocent third party. The original buyer's only argument was that the Civil
Aeronautics Act provisions could not constitutionally apply to an aircraft not used
in interstate flight, and this argument the court specifically rejected. The authority
of the CAB in other connections where the plane was used only in interstate flight
was upheld in United States v. Drumm, 55 F. Supp. 151 (D.Nev. 1944) (pilot's
license) ; Rosenhan v. United States 131 F. 2d 932 (10th Cir. 1942) (certificate of
airworthiness).
2649 U.S.C. 523(c)
No conveyance the recording of which is provided for by subsection (a) (1) of
the section made after August 22, 1938, and no instrument the recording of
which is provided for by subsection (a) (2) of this section or subsections
(a) (3) of this section made on or after June 19, 1948, shall be valid in respect
of such aircraft, aircraft engine or engines, propellers, appliances, or spare
parts against any person by whom the conveyance or other instrument is made
or given, his heir or devisee, or any person having actual notice thereof, until
such conveyance or other instrument is filed for recordation in the office of the
Administrator. For the purposes of this subsection, such conveyance or other
instrument shall take effect from the time and date of its filing for recordation
and not from the time and date of its execution.
(d) Each conveyance or other instrument recorded by means of or under the system
provided for in subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall from the time of its
filing for recordation be valid as to all persons without further or other recordation, except that an instrument recorded pursuant to subsection (a) (3) of this
section shall be effective only with respect to those of such items which may
from time to time be situated at the designated location or locations and only
while so situated: Provided, that an instrument recorded under subsection
(a) (2) of this section shall not be affected as to the engine or engines specifically identified therein, by any instrument theretofore or thereafter recorded
pursuant to subsection (a) (3) of this section.
27 Bishop v. R. S. Evans East Point, Inc., 80 Ga. App. 324, 56 S.E. 2d 134
(1949).
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failure to record was held not to deprive the mortgagee of his priority
where the lien claimant third party had failed to check the appropriate
records 28 or where the third party had actual notice of the prior
29
interest.
The most celebrated case to arise thus far under the Act has been
United States v. United Aircraft Co. ° In this case Hoosier Airfreight
executed two purchase money chattel mortgages to the War Assets
Corporation, each for $17,000, and these were duly recorded with the
CAA under section 523. Hoosier removed the engines from the planes
and shipped the engines to defendant for overhaul. Defendant spent
$10,000 in labor and materials in overhauling the engines before a
petition under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act was filed against
Hoosier. The United States, on behalf of the War Assets Administration, here sought to replevy the engines from the defendant, who contended that the description of the engines as recorded with the CAA
did not provide it with sufficient notice. The court upheld the defendant's argument, and said that the recording must describe the parts
with sufficient definiteness to give notice to persons in the defendant's
class, who were clearly contemplable by the mortgagee. As a result of
this case, specific provisions for recording charges of spare parts and
engines were added to the Act. 81
Robinson v. Smith 2 involved the attempted foreclosure of a chattel
mortgage by the mortgagee, to which the mortgagor interposed objections of illegality. The plane had been mortgaged to the defendant,
an Alabama resident operating an Alabama airfield; it was not used
in Georgia at all. In order to foreclose the plaintiff hired a third party
to rent the plane from the defendant and fly it into Georgia. This was
done by trickery, and the court said that it constituted a "fraudulent
and unconscionable" breach of the bailment, and as a wrongful levy
the foreclosure was defeated. It is not clear what motivated the plaintiff
to attempt such a ploy; Alabama would probably have recognized his
interest in the craft. But the jurisdictional holding seems right; it
involves not a conflicts holding but merely a procedural point under
Georgia law. It would serve as excellent precedent in an international
case where one party felt that he had to get the res into a friendly
jurisdiction to achieve justice. In the best of all possible worlds, this
sort of chicanery would of course not be necessary.
Only one case on the question of chattel security interests in a
conflict of law situation has been unearthed. Anderson v. TriairAssociates33 is an unreported Wisconsin case which serves as a very good
28 Atlas Securities Co. v. Ramsey, 262 Ill. App. 559 (1947), a somewhat questionable holding.
29Marshall v. Anderson, 169 Kan. 41, 216 P. 2d 812 (1950), rehearing 169
Kan. 534, 220 P. 2d 187 (1950).
30 80 F. Supp. 52 (D. Conn. 1948).
3162 Stat. 494 (1948), 49 U.S.C. 523 (a)(3), 523(d) (1952), supra, notes
23 and 26.
3280 Ga. App. 151, 55 S.E. 2d 638 (1949).
33 1949 U.S. Av. R. 440 (Circuit Court, Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, June 18,

1947).
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example of what might be expected in this field. Here Triair, an Illinois corporation, owned a plane which was based in Illinois, upon
which the American Eastern Corporation had a chattel mortgage.
American recorded its chattel mortgage under Illinois law in Cook
County, and mailed notice thereof to the CAA in Washington in February. The CAA notified it that one of the necessary forms had not
been provided; Eastern provided it, but the recording was not finally
effectuated until May. In March the plaintiff, proprietor of a Milwaukee airfield, had approached the defendant in Illinois about some
repairs on the craft here in question. In April defendant flew the plane
to Wisconsin for plaintiff to work on. Plaintiff made no inquiries as
to any interests in the craft held by any other party, but set to work.
When the work was completed in October, defendant refused to pay
the cost, and plaintiff sought to foreclose his mechanic's lien under
Wisconsin law. American asserted its mortgage in the proceedings and
claimed priority under the CAA recording. The court held, however,
(1) that the recording with the CAA was not good until the recording
was completed and the lien here sought to be asserted had arisen by
that date, (2) that there was no duty upon the repairman to make
inquiries in Illinois regarding any interest in the chattel held there,
and (3) that the Wisconsin statute which gave the plaintiff his right
with priority unless the title reservation was filed "as required by law"
means filed under Wisconsin law, which was not done here. The court
therefore gave judgment for the plaintiff against the chattel mortgagee.
The court was probably on its strongest ground in disposing of the
mortgagee's contention that the craft was validly recorded under the
federal statute. A check would probably have shown that the preliminary recordation had been attempted; the subsequent completion of
the formalities required actually did little to affect the "notice" which
the plaintiff could have had upon inquiry. However, the statute did
make certain requirements of those seeking to record interests in chattels, and it is not unfair to refuse to allow someone who has failed to
comply with those requirements, no matter how formal the failure,
to take advantage of them. The 1948 Amendment changed the statute
to provide for mortgages to be good against third parties from the time
"filed for recordation.

''34

Unless the federal recording statute was to be construed as exclusive, which up to that time it had not been, 35 the court was wrong in
refusing to allow the recording of the chattel mortgage at the home
3462 Stat. 494 (1948), 49 U.S.C. 523(c); Kerley Chemical Corp. v. Colboch,
145 Cal. App. 2d 509, 302 P. 2d 621 (1956) applied the new wording of 523 (c) in

a case where the chattel mortgagee mailed the mortgage to the CAA with a request

that it be returned after recording, "if possible," that it might be recorded
locally; this was done after it was noted on the CAA's register as "recorded."
After local recordation, the original was returned to the CAA. The plaintiff had
acquired his interest during the intervening period and contended that the mort-

gage had not been filed with the intent that it be recorded as the statute required.
The court rejected this contention, read the statute as amended, and gave judgment
for the chattel mortgagee.
35 Atlas Securities Co. v. Ramsey, 262 Ill. App. 559 (1947).
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port of the craft to serve as notice at least to those third persons with
actual knowledge of its domicile. The Illinois recording serves as notice
to those who might have occasion to deal with the defendant of the
extent to which its property is mortgaged. Unless the court had been
prepared to go full length, and find that federal notice is enough for all,
as the amendment provided 36 even where the craft is not used in international flight, it seems too strict here.
On its third ground the court seems clearly wrong. The Wisconsin
statute was designed to protect instate mechanics and instate mortgagees against each other. It could but probably would not be applied
in a case where an automobile was brought into the state after valid
recording elsewhere. Defendant could not be "required by law" to file
the mortgage in Wisconsin at the time it was executed.8 7 The court
went on to say,
With particular reference to aircraft it is also well to bear in mind
that a liberal construction should be given to statutory provisions
concerning mechanics liens in respect to their priority in that such
repairs are deemed vitally necessary to promote safety in means
and methods of transportation which have been greatly popularized
since the conclusion of World War 11.88
This language might have some relevance in a case where a plane in
distress had required repairs before it could be flown away. In such a
situation the considerations that influenced the Maryland court in
Universal Credit Co. v. Marks8 9 would be applicable. But in this case

the repairman actively sought the repair business in Illinois, and the
craft was brought into the state particularly to have the repairs done.
In such a situation the interests of the chattel mortgagee who has
recorded locally in full compliance with local law should have been
given paramount consideration. The court's concern with the growth
of air transportation might have been better served by a holding that
validly recorded rights would be recognized in other jurisdictions,
where the domicile of the craft is known to the third party, rather than
a holding giving local interests a short-range benefit.
The Anderson case and the cases which have been decided to date
under section 523 (c) only begin to constitute a body of case law. But
from the latter we can see that the development has been generally to
treat the chattel very much as any other. Constructive notice is provided by proper recording in this area, and all are to be held to notice
of what is present in the Federal registry. The conflict of law problems
which have arisen with respect to automobiles need not affect interstate dealings with aircraft; if the Anderson case came up today, it
would be decided the same way, but the amendment of the statute has
taken the conflicts question out of this area once and for all, and there
36 See note 34, supra.

87 See U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Northwest Engineering Co. 146 Miss.

476, 112 So. 580 (1927).
38 1949 U.S. Av. R., at 448.

89 164 Md. 130, 163A.810 (1932).
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would be no need to consider the Illinois recording. The fact that a
body of state conflict law will not grow up around the airplane is but
another reason for providing in this area in international cases a rule
which can be applied with certainty by the courts of all nations.
IV.
In 1948, writing in the

JOURNAL

OF AIR LAW

AND COMMERCE,

40

the

author of an article on the legal difficulties involved in permitting
secured airline financing through chattel security listed five major
obstacles; his fifth point, although not in order of the difficulty it presented, was the problem of private international law regarding security
interests. He recognized what was then the status quo as a situation
which made any trust impossible, and he spoke of the need of some
sort of international multilateral agreement that would make possible
such secured financing.
In 1948, after many years of discussion and drafting, the ICAO
Legal Committee finally came up with an International Convention
on Rights in Aircraft, 41 called the Geneva Convention. It was felt at
this time that the solution offered by this convention would give rise
42
to a new era in airline financing.
Briefly, the Convention provided a promise by each adherent state
that it would recognize rights validly created in the others. 43 It did not
set up an international standard form of security but allowed the con40 Hines, Legal Difficulties in Secured Airline Financing, 15 JOURNAL OF AIR
11 (1948).
41 Convention on International Rights in Aircraft, 1948; 4 U.S. Treaties and
Other Int'l Agreements 1830, T.I.A.S. No. 2847; 1948 U.S. Av. Rep. 554; 2 Int'l
LAW AND COMMERCE

L.

Q. 437 (1948) (with commentary). For antecedents, see 1 Int'l L. Q. 509 (1947).

42 Calkins, Creation and InternationalRecognition of Title and Security Rights
in Aircraft, 15 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE 156 (1948).
43 Convention, supra note 41, Article I

Article I-Property Rights Recognized
(1) The Contracting States undertake to recognize:
(a) rights of property in aircraft;
(b) rights to acquire aircraft by purchase coupled with possession of the aircraft;
(c) rights to possession of aircraft under leases of six months or more;
(d) mortgages, hypotheques and similar rights in aircraft which are contractually created as security for an indebtedness;
provided such rights
(i) have been constituted in accordance with the law of the Contracting State
in which the aircraft was registered as to nationality at the time of their
constitution, and
(ii) are regularly recorded in a public record of the Contracting State in which
the aircraft is registered as to nationality. The regularity of successive
recordings in different Contracting States shall be determined in accordance with the law of the State where the aircraft was registered as to
nationality at the time of each recording.
(2) Nothing in this Convention shall prevent the recognition of any rights in aircraft under the law of any Contracting State; but Contracting States shall
not admit or recognize any right as taking priority over the rights mentioned
in paragraph (1) of this Article.
Bayitch (Conflict of Law in U. S. Treaties, 8 Miami L. Q. 501 (1954)) reads
Article I as saying that the law applicable by the conflict rule of the home country
will control the international recognition of such interests. This appears to be
directly opposite to the words of Article I.
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tinuance of those forms currently in use nationally. It further adopts
the rule, which this paper contends should be adopted with or without
the Geneva Convention, that the priority of such interests are to be
determined by the law of the flag of the aircraft,4 except in salvage
situations, 45 where the admiralty priority rule is approximated. It has
provisions regulating sale of the craft at the instance of attaching
creditors, 46 and a provision which makes possible security interests
47
which encompass spare parts.

Two law review articles 4" published in 1948 set forth the law embodied in Geneva and what it hoped to accomplish. There is very
little to add to these at this time: to the best of my knowledge no case
has been decided under it. And recent comment 49 indicates that there
is no more secured financing of international aircraft going on now
than before it was adopted.
The Geneva Convention called for only two ratifications to come
into effect 50 and, accordingly, it went into effect on 'September 17,
1953, between the United States and Pakistan.5 1 But since then ratifications have been few and far between.5 2 During the year 1957 there
were no additional ratifications deposited,53 and this despite the optimistic report of the IATA Legal Committee in December, 1953, 54 that
many other as yet unratifying nations were seriously considering it.
5
But this convention, unlike the Warsaw5 5 and Rome Conventions
on personal injury and surface damage liability and limitations, needs
virtually total acceptance to fulfill its objectives. What was sought to
be accomplished was a worldwide system whereby each nation would
be bound to recognize valid interests created in other nations. The fact
that six widely scattered nations besides our own have accepted this
rule of law gives little comfort to the airline which is engaged in activities which call for stops at many way points or those who seek to finance
it by this method.
Professor Knauth r7 has decried the present tendency of international
conflict law to become more and more prolix and variegated. 58 But he
reports that such is the fact; and only international agreements on the
44 Ibid. Article X.
45 Ibid. Article IV.
46 Ibid. Article VII.
47 Ibid. Article X.
48 Wilberforce, The International Recognition of Rights in Aircraft, 2 Int'l
L. Q. 421 (1948) ; Calkins, supra note 42.
49 Adkins and Billyou, supra, note 3.
50 Convention, supra, note 41, Article XX.
51 1953 U.S. and C. Av. R. xiii (blue pages).
52 25 IATA Bull. 68 (1957) ; Treaties in Force 167 (October 31, 1956).
53 25 IATA Bull. 68 (1957).
54 18 IATA Bull. 50 (1953).
55 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to Int'l Transportation by Air (1929), 49 Stat. 3,000 (1934), T.S. No. 876.
56 Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the
Surface, 19 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE 447 (1952).
57 Aviation and Maritime Law, 35 Chi. Bar Record 199 (1954).
58 Ibid. at 200.
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scale of Geneva can prevent it. But perhaps Geneva is but another
casualty in the fall of multilateralism.
A nation is surrendering very little when it agrees to a uniform set
of safety rules, or rules to facilitate customs inspection and embarkation and disembarkation from international aircraft. These cannot but
redound to the benefit of the states mutually promising such restraint
from mutual interference. But property rights, and, as we have seen
since the end of the second world war, rights of commerce and transit,
are not to be so easily surrendered to a multilateral agreement. 59 The
interests which may be at stake in this situation are very likely to be
those of local creditors and purchasers, and a desire not to sign a blank
check for their defeat by a rule of private international law is not a
mental process too difficult to comprehend. The fact that the United
States quickly clasped Geneva to its bosom can explain itself in two
ways: first, the same reasons that impelled us toward the Chicago Convention, with the belief that multilateralism would rule in the postwar
world, and second, that as the manufacturing and financing nation, we
had the most to gain from a worldwide system such as Geneva contemplated. That England did not join us in it is less easy to fathom. It was
the British reluctance to commit itself at Brussels and Geneva that gave
rise to tlhe system adopted; that is, recognition of local rights rather
than the more ambitious project of adopting an entirely new system
of law for aircraft. The French were the other parties at Brussels with
their own operative system of aircraft finance.6 0 To conciliate both the
United States and France, the Geneva system was adopted."' But the
French have likewise refrained from ratification of the Convention.
Thus we are now presented with a fine house in which no one wants
to live. It may perhaps be too soon to say that the entire project ought
to be written off as a loss. An investigation by IATA into just what
has kept the major European nations out of the Convention may be in
order at this point before demolition proceedings are instituted. But
the fact remains that the empty shell of a fine set of laws is little more
than an artistic achievement.
V.
The area of the law which suggests itself as most likely to provide
appropriate analogy is, of course, maritime law. Although the common
law of admiralty is a body of a size and complexity which it seems
unlikely that aviation law will ever achieve, the statutory provisions
in the United States for ship mortgages and their recordation have a
59 "The lesson seems clear: in matters of physical safety, personal comfort, the
elimination of direct delays in service, there is much enthusiasm for international
and multilateral agreement. This is often aided by the offer of lower operating costs
and lower insurance premiums. But in the field of law and of claims for losses and
damage, there is less zeal for uniformity." Ibid. at 203.
60 Wilberforce, supra, note 48.
61 Ibid.
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close resemblance to those enacted for aircraft.6 2 They differ in that
the mortgage or reservation of title in aircraft follow normal common
law rules relating to chattels, while a special international usage for
ships has grown up.
The United States first adopted a ship mortgage act in 1920.63 But
it was not until 1954 that an amendment was added which made it
clear that a foreign mortgage on an American vessel would be recognized in American admiralty cases. 64 An English decision in 192365
arrived at the same result without the aid of a statutory provision, and
our act now so provides. But it is as yet unclear to what extent the
recognized foreign mortgage will in fact be recognized. 66
The American act by its terms applies only to ships of American
registry. 67 The only application of foreign law that can thus take place
would be the recognition of a foreign mortgage, and the priority given
it will be determined under American law. The jurisdictional limit of
the act is thus a rule of private international law: a refusal to deal
with foreign questions of title. The recognition provisions of the act
are a further conflict rule: American law is to determine all priorities,
but it will look to foreign law to determine which interests in an
American vessel are to be recognized. It is submitted that such a division of international responsibility is most likely to result in proper
application of the law by the court most familiar with it.
Under the Brussels Convention of 1926,68 several European nations
adopted a system of recognition and priority which involved rights
created in different states. The recognition of security interests is governed by the law of the state of creation, 69 but the priority is provided
for in terms by the Convention.70 This agreement bears a strong resemblance, in its basic framework, to the Geneva Convention. The United
States has never been a party to it.
VI.
Any problem of property rights is at least partially one of power,
where that power is sought to be exercised by those having possession
of the object in question. An airplane must alight from time to time,
to do the business which is its raison d'etre. While on the ground, it is
62 Knauth, Aviation and Maritime Law, 35 Chi. Bar Record 199 (1954). The
usual maritime rule is that the law of the flag controls questions of the passage of
title. Rabel, supra, note 4; Lord and Glenn, The Foreign Ship Mortgage, 56 Yale
L. J. 523 (1947) ; but cf. Zaphiriou, supra, note 19 at 211.
63 41 Stat. 1,000 (1920), 46 U.S.C. 911-84 (1952); Gilmore and Black, Law of
Admiralty, 571 (1957).
6468 Stat. 323 (1954), 46 U.S.C.A. 951 (pocket part); Gilmore and Black,

supra, at 577.
65 The Colorado, (1923) P. 102 (C.A.).
66 Gilmore and Black, supra, at 578-9.
67 41 U.S.C. 922 (1952).
68 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
Maritime Liens and Mortgages (Brussels, 1926); 6 Benedict, Admiralty, 78
(1941 ed.).

69 Ibid. See. 1.
70 Ibid. Sec. 2.
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subject to the jurisdiction of local officials, and those at whose instance
they act. To the extent that questions of international flight are questions of international politics, the problems of chattel security are
illusory. Where the United States is prepared to assert the claims of
its airlines and those financing them, matters so ephemeral as the law
need not concern us. But the protection of property interests in a
chattel, where the rule of law governs, rests in the last analysis on those
who have possession of the chattel. The fact that American jurisdictions
have protected such interests where created in other jurisdictions7 ' is
not necessarily any aid in our dealings with foreign nations.
The proposal here made is essentially a simple one: it would do no
more than extend the statutory American ship mortgage rule to cases
involving aircraft, at the same time demanding foreign recognition
of such a rule and granting it to the flag aircraft of other nations. It
is my position that the law of the flag of the aircraft should govern all
dealings with the craft, in whatever land, and regardless of what law
the parties in the second state consider themselves to be acting under.
with the choice strictly
Such a rule is essentially a choice of law rule,
72
limited and virtually automatic in all cases.
The United States already has in operation a system of chattel
security for aircraft, 7s under which substantive rules of priority have
been developed. It is a recording system with national jurisdiction,
under which all domestic dealings with property interests in aircraft
are registered with the Civil Aeronautics Board. 74 This proposal would
make the law which has been and will be developed under this act
applicable to all interests in the craft, no matter where created.
71 Supra, 4-6.
72 Problems which might arise by reason of airlines of an international character, like the Scandinavian Airways System, could be solved either by a fairly
arbitrary assignment of nationality to each particular craft or by piercing the veil
to determine the actual national origin of the craft. The CAB has in the past
pierced the corporate veil to determine the nationality of the owners of an airline
corporation. See TACA S.A. Foreign Air Carrier Permit 7 CAB 715 (1946);
Venezuelan Permit 7 CAB 317 (1946). With reference to S.A.S. see 15 CAB 396
(1952).
73 Notes 21, 23, and 26, supra. The regulations adopted under 49 U.S.C. 523
indicate that the United States is prepared to apply the rules of the Geneva Convention. These regulations are designed in part to prevent any airplane from
having dual nationality. 14 C.F.R. 501.4(c) Aircraft Previously Registered in
Foreign Countries:
A registration certificate will be issued by the Administrator for aircraft
which have last been registered under the laws of foreign countries if the
applicant...
(2) submits a statement signed by a proper official of the country of foreign registry that all holders of recorded rights against the aircraft have been satisfied
or have consented to the transfer of registry; or
(3) submits evidence satisfactory to the Administrator that the foreign registry
has terminated or is invalid,* or that the country of foreign registry does not
supply information with respect to recorded rights in aircraft.
* The United States is a party to and has ratified the International Convention on
International Recognition of Rights in Aircraft, signed at Geneva on June 19, 1948.
Ratification of this Convention by other signatory countries may result in limiting
the application of this clause to cases in which ownership in the country of export
has been terminated by a sale on execution carried out in conformity with the provisions of the Convention.
74 Notes 21, 23, and 26, supra.
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This proposal involves a negation of the usual American and English rule in such matters. That rule is without doubt proper when
dealing with the usual sort of stationary chattel. It is arguable, however,
that it ought not be applied to chattels which serve as means of transportation, even absent statutory change. In cases not involving means
of transportation security of transaction should in most cases outweigh
secqrity of ownership as a consideration. An immovable of course is
the strongest possible case for application of the lex situs; but by the
same token an item of property which is always in motion presents a
weak case for allowing its place at any given time to control the law
to be applied to those dealing with it. At the same time its nature gives
notice to any and all who may have occasion to deal with it that it has
had more than one situs during its lifetime. No one acquiring an interest in an aircraft would be being held to an objectionable burden if it
were concluded that his observation that it had wings constituted
notice that it most probably has been dealt with somewhere else. In
such cases the argument for allowing some fixed law to control has
equal force as in the case of real estate. In one case the situs never
changes; in the other it always does. Much more is this the case with
ships and commercial aircraft than with automobiles, which, in this
country at least, are used for local intrastate traffic at least as much as,
if not more than, for interstate or international travel. 75
In the case of automobiles, which constitute the source of most of
the American cases in this area, the courts have normally applied the
law of the second state to aid the holder of the security interests against
third parties, 76 under their own conflict rules, although recognizing
that the law of the first state controlled as between the parties. Where
the automobile has been wrongfully taken into the second state by the
buyer, and there dealt into the hands of third parties, there is less
unanimity. 77 But an automobile is a state-registered item, and its registration in most states is not to protect security of transaction but has to
do with re-licensing, which may have little or nothing to do with the
question of security ownership or reservation of title.78 These facts, and
the smaller cash amounts ordinarily involved in the sale of an automobile, particularly a used one, militate against requiring a title search
which might involve more than one state and costs disproportionate to
the cost of the chattel being transferred. These considerations are not
present in the case of ships and airplanes, which have universally had a
national registry, which is directly tied to the question of the ownership
of the property. 79 Further, the amounts involved in the sale of any merchant ship or commercial aircraft are of sufficient magnitude to justify
75 See Leary, Horse and Buggy Lien Law and Migratory Automobiles, 96 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 455 (1948).
76 Supra, note 11.
77 Ibid.
78 In states which treat registration of ownership as "title" to the automobile,
it could be that the law of registration could be effectively made to follow the car,
if the court of the second state were willing to so hold.
79 52 Stat. 1005 (1938), 49 U.S.C. 421 (1952).
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the imposition of a greater cost, which of course contributes to the security of the transaction. These considerations, and that of notice, furnish
persuasive reasons for limiting the usual approach to (a) movables
which are not ordinarily transported, (b) automobiles, and perhaps

(c) cargoes.8 0
There are few if any difficulties resultant from an application of
this proposal greater than those which must always follow in a case
where one forum seeks to apply the substantive law of another. Of
course, the more dissimilar the two systems of law, the more difficult
such a foreign application. But there is no way of avoiding this problem, while still operating under a rule of law, where property passes
into and out of jurisdictions in every corner of the world daily.
It is believed that this proposal will give a substantial degree of
protection to American institutions financing both American and foreign airlines. Our law provides adequate protection to security interests
in both aircraft and spare parts."'
American recognition of foreign rights under this rule will of
course rest on application by our courts of the foreign law. But as long
as we are advised of this fact and can take whatever steps are necessary
under such a law to protect the parties in this country dealing with
foreign craft, we will again be the beneficiaries of such a rule. In practice a foreign jurisdiction which does not recognize rights of the sort
created in this country will find itself without any available source of
credit here. The burden would then rest upon them to recognize such
foreign created rights under their own law, or suffer serious limitations
upon their ability to do business here. Furthermore, a rule of law in
the foreign jurisdiction which did not recognize security interests
would prove a large block against any airlines being financed by American interests. Particularly where the foreign nation has a state-owned
or controlled airline would such legislative persuasion be likely to be
effective.
Even failing legislative adoption of the proposed rule (as discussed
below), it would hardly seem to be too great a step for a court sitting
in a case involving international questions of rights in aircraft to adopt
such a rule, as regards instrumentalities of transportation. This, of
course, could not guarantee reciprocity of application, and might, if
applied from one side of the fence, only reach some at least superficially
80 With reference to cargoes of ships or airplanes, as long as they remain
identifiable as such, the fact of notice as to their past transportation remains the
same as with the craft itself. In Cammel v. Sewell 5 H. & N. 728, 157 E. R. 1371
(1860) trover was brought by the original owners of the cargo against purchasers
from the ship's captain. The ship was German, and the cargo had been shipped
from Russia to England by the plaintiffs, an English partnership. The ship ran
aground in Norway, and while there the cargo was sold by the captain to Norwegians, who then sent it on to the defendant in England. The English court gave
effect to the Norwegian transaction.
81 Spare parts are considered as a part of the plane (or group of planes) for
which they constitute replacements. Thus such parts even when located abroad
should be considered as subject to the American law under this rule. Current provisions for recordation and reserved rights good against spare parts are found in
62 Stat. 494 (1948), .49 U.S.C. 523 (a) (3), 523 (c) (1952), and in the Geneva
Convention, supra,note 41, Article X.
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hard results. But if the world's body of private international law is to
grow more cohesive, the promulgation of such a rule by a court of
stature could well be a move in the right direction. The limitation
of such a rule to means of transportation which are nationally registered gives it a logical, determinable scope.
VII.
Obviously, no single act of any legislative body or court can effectuate the proposal here made.8 2 What is being proposed is a substantive
rule of international conflict law, but it is in fact a private law rule.
It would act to designate the law governing of the creation and transfer
of primary rights and remedies among parties doing business with
reference to aircraft. As such, it must meet the tests of commercial
feasibility and political acceptability.
The Congress of the United States has acted to provide national
registration of aircraft sales and mortgages.8 3 We have in this area a
national recording system. 4 We also have much other evidence of
national interest in the American aircraft industry, both in the legislative and executive arms of the government, not the least of which is
in the form of subsidies.8 5 This hardly seems to be an area where an
idea which the industry and its regulators consider to be for the industry's benefit need wither on the vine because of legislative inertia or
confusion. The power to act seems clear; the implementation should
be supplied by those who feel the need.
But even American adoption of such a rule would have little effect
on the situation. The persons for whose benefit this proposal is primarily made are American carriers and manufacturers. The persons
to be effected adversely, at least in the short run, will be foreign creditors and purchasers. The acknowledgement by any other such nation,
not a large manufacturer of planes, or one with a government owned
airline which has not problems of airline finance, is unlikely without
some form of persuasion by the United States. Such persuasion, it is
believed, could best come in the negotiation of bilateral agreements.
This country has been exceedingly generous in its granting of fifth
freedom rights to foreign carriers. It hardly seems too great an exaction
to require them to adopt a rule of law which would not prejudice their
governments directly. The rule is inherently a fair one to both parties.
Persons in other nations can of course be assured fair American application of the rule as regards their aircraft in this country. Under such
an agreement the United States also asks such treatment when its
planes fly into other nations.
82 Bayitch, supra, note 43, states that there are two methods of solving international conflict problems to make planning possible. The first is by the adoption

of common substantive rules by two states. The second, more frequent method, is
the adoption of a treaty. He comments on the United States' usual reluctance to
enter into such agreements.
83 Supra, notes 21, 24, 26.
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Stat. 998 (1938), 49 U.S.C. 486 (1952).

